一、主题：Systemic risk-taking at banks: Evidence from the pricing of syndicated loans

二、主讲人：宫迪，荷兰蒂尔堡大学经济学博士，伦敦经济学院访问学者。2010年获得中国人民大学金融学学士学位，2012年获得蒂尔堡大学经济学硕士学位。研究领域包括银行与金融中介、金融经济学等。其研究成果在Emerging Scholars in Banking & Finance Conference, International Finance and Banking Society Conference, FDIC-JFSR Annual Bank Research Conference, INFER Workshop on Banking in Europe等多个国际学术会议参加宣讲，并获得EBC Junior Fellow Best Paper Award，Royal Economic Society Conference Grant等奖项。

三、时间：2014年11月17日（周一），12：30-13：30

四、地点：中央财经大学主楼913会议室

五、主持：黄志刚，必赢565net官网副教授、院长助理

论文摘要：Public guarantees in the event of joint bank failures can result in systemic risk-taking and distort financing decisions of banks. I argue that the pricing of syndicated loans provides an ideal laboratory to study such distortions. In the absence of systemic risk-taking, non-diversi ability of aggregate risk implies that the compensation required for taking on aggregate risk is higher than for idiosyncratic risk. However, in the presence of public guarantees, banks have higher benefits from taking on aggregate risk as this leads to higher correlation across banks. Consistent with the latter I find that, after controlling for rm, loan and bank specific factors, banks charge lower rates for systematic risk than for idiosyncratic risk. The effect is large. Importantly, there is no evidence for systemic risk-taking for the sample of non-bank lenders who do not benefit from public guarantees. I also find that effect is larger for smaller and less correlated banks, consistent with higher a priori benefits from systemic risk-taking for such banks. The evidence provided suggests that public bail-out policies have significant ex-ante costs by distorting financing decisions in the economy.